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The institutionalized control mechanisms regulating accordances between the constitution & the law (ie, "constitutional control") in the (former) USSR were seriously affected by radical social, economic, & political transformations in the late 1980s. Important reforms in constitutional control processes include participation in the legislative process, & overseeing dispute resolution between the various territories, jurisdictions, & ethnic groups. The reorganization of the organs of constitutional control led to the establishment in 1990 of a four-tier system comprising a President of the USSR, the Congress of People's Deputies to the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, & the Committee for Constitutional Supervision. The power, type of legislation possible, & duties of each tier are detailed. It is noted in conclusion that no provisions have been made for the post-Soviet period in the independent republics. 10 References. J. Sadler

THIS PAPER EXPLORES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROCESSES OF DECISION MAKING AND THEIR OUTCOMES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIVIDUALISTIC CONSTITUTIONAL CALCULUS. THE MOTIVATION IS PRIMARILY METHODOLOGICAL. A TAXONOMY AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK ARE SUGGESTED WHICH EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION SETTER, AND WHICH ALLOW DECISION MAKING PROCESSES TO BE VIEWED AS BOTH MEANS AND ENDS. THE FRAMEWORK IS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE RECEIVED LITERATURE.

Throughout history, decisions to go to war have been made by a handful of individuals in powerful positions. American constitutionalists from James Madison's day through our own have tried to establish a better system of deciding for war, by shifting the locus of responsibility from one person to a broadly representative group. The Persian Gulf crisis has shown all too vividly what dangers lie in the persistence of processes that put awesome amounts of force at the disposition of single individuals, and how much is at stake in developing and nurturing structures of deliberation and accountability.

This paper refers to the subject of constitutional control of public agencies in the Chilean constitutional and democratic state, from the point of view of the relationship between democratic state and the rule of law. Within this framework, the paper begins with a description of the basic features of the whole system of constitutional control in Chilean law. Then, more specifically, it reviews judicial constitutional control that takes place through the Recurso de Protección, an action aimed at the protection of people's fundamental rights. In this context, the paper stresses the role played by fundamental rights in Chilean legal mechanisms of constitutional control, which sometimes go beyond these rights' natural purposes and denaturalize their legal meaning. ; Este trabajo aborda el tema del control constitucional de los poderes públicos en el Estado constitucional y democrático de derecho chileno, a partir de la relación existente entre Estado democrático y Estado de Derecho. En este marco, el estudio se centra, en primer lugar, en una descripción de las notas principales del sistema integral de control constitucional vigente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, para luego, en forma más específica, analizar el control constitucional que realizan los tribunales de justicia, a partir de la tutela de los derechos fundamentales de las personas mediante el denominado Recurso de Protección. En este contexto, el trabajo pone de relieve el rol que juegan estos derechos en el sistema jurídico de control en el ordenamiento chileno, excediendo en ocasiones su ámbito de actuación y desnaturalizando su concepción jurídica.

The article presents a comparative analysis of the European and the American model of judicial constitutional control. Exploring the reasons for the implementation of the European model of the constitutional control in the post-Soviet States of Eastern Europe and the CIS, the author comes to the conclusion that the introduction of the institution of the constitutional justice of the European design was a logical step in the establishment of constitutionalism in the region. Experience of the Western European States was taken into consideration while building the system of constitutional justice in the post-Soviet States of Eastern Europe and the CIS. However, we are not talking about blind copying of Western European experience, but rather of its creative processing taking into account the specifics of a particular State and its legal system.

El sistema de control de constitucionalidad en Colombia diseñado en el Acto Legislativo n.º 3 de 1910 es un hito dentro de una larga y fecunda tradición política y constitucional que mucho le debe a sus raíces hispanas y a sus desarrollos americanos. Tanto la acción pública de inconstitucionalidad como la excepción de inconstitucionalidad tienen claros antecedentes en el constitucionalismo de las Españas y de la Colonia, fueron elaboradas por una Asamblea Constituyente que obró con conocimiento y fidelidad a esa tradición; y han sido y son instituciones capitales de nuestro Estado social y democrático de derecho ; The system of constitutional control in Colombia designed in the Legislative Act n.º 3 of 1910 is a milestone in a long and fruitful political and constitutional tradition owes much to his Hispanic roots and its American developments. Both the public action of unconstitutionality as the plea of unconstitutionality have clear precedents in the constitutionalism of Spain and the Colony were prepared by a Constituent Assembly acted with knowledge and faithfulness to that tradition and have been and are institutions of our capital social and democratic state of law.

Resumen: En el presente trabajo se explicará cómo se realiza el control de constitucionalidad en la República de Colombia y luego se realizarán, en forma sucinta, observaciones respecto de dicho control. Resulta llamativo el hecho de que sin perjuicio de que a la Corte Constitucional se le encomendó la guarda de la integridad y supremacía de la Constitución Política, el control de constitucionalidad no es concentrado, sino más bien mixto. Ello así por cuanto la jurisdicción constitucional es compartida, por un lado, con el Consejo del Estado y, por otro, con el resto de los jueces. Asimismo, el referido control puede ser realizado por cualquier autoridad administrativa e, incluso, por los particulares, cuando tienen que aplicar una norma jurídica en un caso concreto. ; Abstract: This work explains how the constitutional control is carried out in the Republic of Colombia. It is remarkable that, though the Political Constitution of Colombia trusts the Constitutional Court for the maintenance of its integrity, this country does not have a concentrated constitutional review system, but a mixed one. This is so because the constitutional jurisdiction is shared by the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the rest of the judges from the Judicial Branch. Likewise, the constitutional control can be carried out by any administrative authority or individual when, in a specific case, they must apply a particular rule.

What are the main variations in the constitutional control of the executive in 45 parliamentary democracies and how can these differences be accounted for? Four competing hypotheses, based on dichotomies, explain the degree of this control by means of contrasting institutional settings: consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, thick versus thin constitutionalism and established versus new democracies. These hypotheses are tested with the help of fuzzy-sets that allow for varying degrees of membership that go beyond the presence/absence suggested by these dichotomies. The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control are specified with the help of this new methodology. The fuzzy-set analysis shows that the degree of constitutional control can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional conditions stemming from the four dichotomies, and not by one single dimension. This constellation remains hidden for the traditional correlational techniques like regression. Hence, the fuzzy-set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can be used to reveal causalities.

What are the main variations in the constitutional control of the executive in 45 parliamentary democracies and how can these differences be accounted for? Four competing hypotheses, based on dichotomies, explain the degree of this control by means of contrasting institutional settings: consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, thick versus thin constitutionalism and established versus new democracies. These hypotheses are tested with the help of fuzzy-sets that allow for varying degrees of membership that go beyond the presence/absence suggested by these dichotomies. The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control are specified with the help of this new methodology. The fuzzy-set analysis shows that the degree of constitutional control can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional conditions stemming from the four dichotomies, and not by one single dimension. This constellation remains hidden for the traditional correlational techniques like regression. Hence, the fuzzy-set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can be used to reveal causalities.